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Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner
Memorial Lecture'
"Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law"t
by
WAEL B. HALLAQ*

There is now little that is novel in the idea that the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, brought home to the United States an imminent
danger, one never encountered before. For the first time in American
history, a brutal attack was made in the heartland, one that carried with
it devastating consequences. This tragedy was no doubt surprising, not
only because it happened at all but also because it happened in the way
and in the places that it did. Yet, what is equally surprising, particularly
in light of its magnitude, is the little attention it drew in the way of sober
analysis. There was little, if any, attempt to understand where its causes
lay, and how closely it may have been tied to the phenomenon that we
call-in truly abstract, confused, and indiscriminate ways-Islam.
It has been often said, before September 11 and since, that such
hostile acts as terrorism are precipitated by Islamic fundamentalism and
its advocates. Observers less sympathetic to Islam and Muslims have
tended to see the violence as causally connected with the entire religion
of Islam as a culture and creed. These observers have imputed to the
religion and culture certain qualities, nearly genetic in nature, which
make it inherently hostile and violent. In the West, Islam has nowadays
come to be a synonym for aggression and violence. Unfortunately, such
essentialist views were sometimes propounded by highly politicized
academics who had spent decades studying Islamic history and culture.

t The Matthew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, San Francisco, California, March 5, 2003. The annual Matthew 0. Tobriner Memorial
Lecture was established in honor of former California Supreme Court Justice and former Hastings

faculty member Matthew 0. Tobriner. Each year Hastings College of the Law sponsors a lecture by a
distinguished legal scholar or prominent personality to build on the legacy of Justice Tobriner's
outstanding accomplishments as a legal scholar and jurist.
tt The Lecture was titled "Traditional Law and the Legal Crises of Modern Islam."
* Professor, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.
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There is no doubt that an intelligent and dispassionate analysis of
the situation requires not only the total abandonment of what I call the
"genetic approach," an approach that is both dangerous and fruitless; it
requires a careful and open-minded examination of the phenomenon
concerned, so that we can make sense of its constitution, orientation,
and, no less importantly, how it historically came to be. To arrive at a
genuine understanding of the problem, it is also essential to set aside
one's own ideological centricity, for insistence on the latter will not only
lead nowhere but will replicate-indeed exacerbate-the problem. In
fact, dealing with Islam from where we stand today amounts to dealing
with the "Other," while the challenge of gaining a correct understanding
as to why the Muslim world seems at odds with Western values and
Western ways-be they political, cultural, or otherwise-requires as
much impartiality as one can muster. A prerequisite for such an understanding is the appreciation on our part of the indelible connection that
Muslims feel with God, a tie that the Christian West for the most part
severed long ago. The idea of giving to Caesar what is Caesar's and to
God what is God's does not wash in theMuslim world-view, for Caesar is
only a man, and men, being equal, cannot command obedience to each
other. Obedience therefore must be to a supreme entity, one that is
eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient. If modernity has effected profound
changes in Islamic culture (and no doubt it has), it has failed in the most
important respect, namely, to alter or sever this tie with the divine. In
due course we shall see that, in reaction to the last century's experience,
today's Muslims have reaffirmed this tie in ever-stronger terms. To
demand of them that they abandon their God is not only unfair and
supercilious but will, more importantly, lead only to a repeat of the
mistakes made during the recent and not-so-recent past.
The events of September 11 must be seen as the tip of the iceberg, a
culmination, that is, of a massive historical process that originated a
century and a half ago, and that in time intensified with disastrous
results. With the burden of a century and a half of a history that has
gone awry, it behooves us to look at it carefully. Surely, the causes of
Muslim discontent are many-political, social, economic, ethical, and
much else. Yet, a common thread of an eminently legal sort runs
through all these causes; if these causes are the warp of the phenomenon
concerned, then the legal element is certainly its woof. The question
then is: How does law figure in the equations of violence and hostility?
Why should law, in other words, have to do in the least with such horrific
acts as the murdering of civilians?
It should not come as a surprise that of all the factors that may
account for the Islamic fundamentalists' acts and world-view, law stands
foremost, competing in importance with the political-a significant other
category. Yet, despite the importance of things legal to the individual
Muslim and to the entire culture of Islam past and present, the emphasis
placed on explaining "the roots of Muslim rage" has been primarily
political, but not without dire epistemological consequences which
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strongly tended to obscure intelligent analysis rather than enhance it.
But even the rise of new political structures in the Muslim world cannot
be seen as the result of purely political considerations, for at the heart of
Muslim politics and political theory, and at the basis of their conduct and
conception, there lies a significant deposit, if not a rich substrate, of law.
In what follows, I shall attempt to map out the contours of the
historical developments that led Muslims to the present predicament,
one that is entrenched in despair, fear, and alienation. To appreciate the
full force of this predicament, we must briefly look at the cultural role
Islamic law played in the lives of Muslims for over thirteen centuries; at
the essential fact that Islam was a religion and culture of law; at the
fundamental legal transformations the Muslim world has undergone
during the last century and a half; at the political implications of these
legal transformations; and finally at the combined effects of these
structural, legal, and political transformations as indices of what has
become a mutilated cultural identity.
It would in no way be an exaggeration to argue that law was the
defining characteristic of Muslim societies and civilizations throughout
the centuries, and in every corner of the Islamic world, ranging from
Indonesia and Malaysia to Algeria and Morocco. As Joseph Schacht, the
distinguished father of Islamic legal studies in the West, put it some forty
years ago, "Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, the most
typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of
Islam itself.... [T]he whole life of the Muslims, Arabic literature, and
the Arabic and Islamic disciplines of learning are deeply imbued with the
ideas of Islamic law; it is impossible to understand Islam without
understanding Islamic law." 1 With the benefit of hindsight, and considering the developments that have taken place since the Islamic revolution
of Iran in 1979, Schacht's acute observations are more true now than
ever. One may even add that law defined not only the Muslim way of
life, but also the entire culture and psyche of Muslims throughout
fourteen centuries. Islamic law governed the Muslim's way of life in
literally every detail, from political government to the sale of real
property, from hunting to the etiquette of dining, from sexual relations to
worship and prayer. It determined how Muslims conducted themselves
in society and in their families; how they designed and ordered their
cities and towns; and, in short, how they viewed themselves and the
world around them. If Islamic civilization, culture, or state ever constituted a regime of any kind, it was one of nomocracy. There has never
been a culture in human society so legally oriented as Islam. With the
recent significant advances in our scholarship on the history of Islamic
law, we have come to realize-more than ever-that Islamic law was not
merely a legal system that resolved conflicts and negotiated social and
economic relationships (the role normally assigned to law in the West),
but that it was in addition a theological system, an applied religious
1. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
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ritual, an intellectual enterprise of the first order, a cultural pillar of farreaching dimensions and, in short, a world-view that defined both
Muslim identity and even Islam itself.
Politics was subsidiary to law and entirely subservient to it. This is a
fact of paramount importance, dictating much of what happened
between the rise of Muhammad and the early nineteenth century. The
Caliph and Sultan saw themselves and were seen by all others as subject
to the holy law of God. And sure enough, notwithstanding the occasional violation, both rulers and their agents took this divine superiority
for granted and as a rule conducted themselves in accordance with its
dictates. If there is one inalienable feature of the Muslim body politic
and legal culture it is the prevalence of the rule of law, with the political
sovereign accepting without challenge the supreme authority of the
divine law and hence that of the jurists and judges-custodians of the law
and its interpreters as well as the civic leaders of the Muslim
communities wherever they were present. No ruler or political might
could challenge the divine law and its spokesmen. The rich, the
powerful, and the poor, from sultan to pauper, all stood as equals in the
presence of the humble, informal Muslim court to receive judgment.
There were no special rules for the mighty, and none could question their
eternal submission to the law of God. The Law was deemed to stand
2
above anything human.
It is this recognition on the part of the state and its functionaries
that has preserved the distinction between worldly power and the
province of the law. And it is this recognition that rendered the law so
remarkably independent throughout twelve centuries of Islamic history.
The state's legal power was accordingly limited to the appointment and
dismissal of judges, and no doubt the state used this prerogative to
exercise as much influence as it could muster. But the state had also
accepted the fact that, once the judge was appointed, it could do nothing
but bow to the Law as applied by the court. Judicial independence and
the rule of law no doubt re Presented two of the most striking features of
traditional Islamic cultures.
The Muslim court applied what we may call "jurists' law," an
expression bearing much significance. Islamic law is properly defined as
jurists' law because it is a product of the jurist's hermeneutical labors,
based, as it were, on the revealed texts and the methods of interpretation
that were seen to derive from these very sources. The Quran stood
supreme as an authoritative legal text, but the major bulk of the law
2. On the relationship between law and politics, see W. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EARLY
ch. 6 (forthcoming) [hereinafter HALLAQ,

EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

ORIGINS]; MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, RELIGION AND POLITICS UNDER THE EARLY 'ABBASIDS:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROTO-SUNNI ELITE chs. 3-4 (1997).

3. That actual violations of the rule of law did take place should not negate the centrality of the
principle and its dominant functioning within Islamic legal cultures. Such violations could have no
more been detrimental to the rule of law than certain covert (and now not so covert) acts of the
American government during the past half-century.
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derived from the Sunna of the Prophet, those utterances and deeds
attributed to the founder of Islam. Juristic consensus and the inferential
method known as qiyas provided the mechanisms for elaborating, in
terms of legal reasoning, the raw subject matter of the revealed texts.
Without qiyas and the entire system of legal hermeneutics developed by
the jurists, the revealed texts would remain empty of legal significance,
for it was this hermeneutic that brought out their legal import. In other
words, God did not reveal a law proper but only textual signs or textual
indications that required the intervention of the human rational faculty
in order to bring out into a human reality what was seen as a sacred law.
Thus, if God revealed the basic building blocks of the law, it was the
jurists who built the House of Shari'a.4
The authority of the jurists, however, must not be confused with any
notions of worldly power, since they wielded none. Nor was their
authority of the charismatic or even moral type, though these types of
authority were not entirely precluded. Nor, yet, was their authority
purely religious, for the Islamic scene witnessed a number of learned
religious classes who, despite their impressive erudition and intellectual
output, were entirely devoid of legal authority. The jurists' authority was
predominantly, if not essentially, epistemic.5 Their very learning and
erudition bestowed on them the authority that they enjoyed, in the first
place the authority to interpret the law, but also the authority to
command what is morally good and forbid what is morally bad, to lead
and administer society and its civic institutions, to collect taxes, to
represent the orphans and the downtrodden, to run educational
institutions and law schools, and to supervise charities and public works.6
If the jurists enjoyed an over-arching authority as civic leaders, their
authority as legal interpreters stood paramount. This authority derived
in no small part from their ability to wield the interpretive tool known as
iftihad, i.e., the profound hermeneutical competence to engage the divine
word in the mundane, worldly affairs of human reality. The perfect
cultivation of this hermeneutic meant an ability to decipher what Godin all probability-wanted Muslims to do or not do, this being the
deontic basis of law. It meant, in other words, the epistemic and intellectual competence to make God's will apparent to humans. And there was
something extraordinary in the very fact that all this amounted to the
ability-erudite and scholarly from first to last-to enter, or try to enter,
into God's mind.
4. On legal reasoning and the methodology of law, see BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SEARCH FOR
GOD'S LAW (1992); WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES chs. 2-3 (1997)
[hereinafter HALLAO, HISTORY].
5. On epistemic authority in Islamic law, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY,
AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001).

6. On these functions, see Emile Tyan, Judicial Organization, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST
VOLUME 1: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 236 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny
eds., 1955); EMILE TYAN, HISTOIRE DE L'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE EN PAYS D'ISLAM (2d ed.
1960).
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It was this power of hermeneutic that elevated these jurists to the
highest social and political ranks, so much so that they embodied the
counterbalance and equalizer of temporal might. Politics and the bodypolitic itself were deemed, by default, the province of worldly temptation
and corruption. By virtue of this fact, the judge who was appointed and
paid by the state became suspect. The Islamic legal literature is replete
with references to the precarious and dubious role of judges as agents of
corrupt politics. Receiving an appointment as a judge was, for the
appointee and his family, a cause for lament, associated with a strong
sense of adversity. Many jurists preferred to be whipped or jailed rather
than accept judicial appointment.' It is not an exaggeration to say that
such an appointment, once accepted, diminished the personal authority
of the jurist, and exposed him to suspicion-if not actual charges-of
corruption and lack of rectitude. Thus, the Islamic legal profession
seems to have been consistent in dissociating itself from the state and its
temporal might, and largely succeeded in doing so for over a millennium-that is, until the middle of the nineteenth century.8
It is therefore accurate to say that Islamic law was a system that
operated outside of state and government influence, constituting in effect
its counterbalance. And it did so with remarkable independence and
success. This dichotomy found eloquent expression in the metaphor that
the sword's true counterpart is the pen, the hallmark of the jurist and the
religious scholar. This pen, without any doubt, was responsible for the
creation of a body of law and an intellectually and culturally imposing
jurisprudence that persisted with creative tenacity until the middle of the
nineteenth century.
Recent scholarship on the history of Islamic law-especially in the
United States, Canada, and Germany-has shown the impressive extent
to which Islamic law was a working system that evolved in tandem with
the developments that Islamic societies from Transoxania to Andalusia
and the Maghreb experienced over the centuries. These relatively new
findings stand in opposition to the discourse that dominated the field for
decades, roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century until the
seventies of the last. Once dominated by the civil servants of the
imperial powers, conventional scholarship-mainly European-found it
imperative to relegate Islamic law to the status of a relic of the past, and
viewed it furthermore as archaic, rigid, primitive, and incapable of
change. Needless to say, this is not entirely unexpected, since it was
necessary for these civil servants, who functioned concomitantly (and
inextricably) as colonial administrators and scholars, to rationalize their
empires' domination and imposition of new legal and other structures. 9
7. HALLAO, ORIGINS, supra note 2, at ch. 8.

8. Id. at ch. 6.
9. Wael B. Hallaq, The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist
Discourse,2 UCLA J. OF ISLAMIC AND NEAR EASTERN L 1, 1-31 (2002-03). This discourse is echoed
in a variety of other intellectual spheres. See, for example, the work of EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM
(1978); THIERRY HENTSCH, IMAGINING THE MIDDLE EAST (Fred A. Reed trans., 1992); MEYDA
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For already, beginning with the middle of the nineteenth century, Islamic
law had undergone a process of change that was to lead to its virtual, if
not total, decimation. Happily, direct colonialism is a thing of the past
(or one so hopes), and scholarship now appears somewhat freer from the
cultural assumptions of domination. The result has been a near-total
revolution in Islamic legal studies, especially during the last two decades.
It is readily acknowledged nowadays that there was no dislocation
between Islamic law and the society that it served; that law was socially
linked throughout; and that it responded to the challenges of social and
economic change until its near-total decimation in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
One of the most fundamental questions that arises from this brief
account is: If Islamic law served Muslim societies so well, and if Muslim
loyalties were to the law before anything or anyone else, then why was
the Law of God decimated? What conceivable purpose could this
momentous act have served? The answer to this question is by no means
easy to provide within the space permitted here, but it is not difficult to
summarize it in outline.
By the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had ceased to
threaten the gates of Vienna and had begun a process of decline, while
European states experienced a simultaneous technological and economic
advance. This rise ushered in a new relationship between the Islamic
East and Europe, which embarked on a policy of colonization aimed at
its immediate Muslim neighbors as well as the Muslim kingdoms and
sultanates in far away lands. The British, French, Spaniards, Portuguese,
and Dutch, among others, conquered massive territories and exercised
direct and indirect colonial control over them. One of the last to fall into
disarray was the Ottoman Empire, most of whose possessions, save for
modern day Turkey, were divided in 1916 among the British and the
French in what is known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.' With this neartotal conquest, the Muslim world, except such (then) impoverished
regions as Saudi Arabia, faced an unprecedented wave not only of
military and economic colonization but, more importantly, the
modernizing effects of Europe. But even before World War I, the
Ottoman Empire had been forced into a program of political and
administrative restructuring whereby the initial steps toward government
centralization were affected. This restructuring aimed at, and resulted in,
the formation of what was to become the nation-state, an entity alien to
the indigenous cultures of Muslim lands. It is in this newly emerging

YEGENOGLU, COLONIAL FANTASIES: TOWARDS A FEMINIST READING OF ORIENTALISM (1998); A.L.

Tibawi, English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism, 8
ISLAMIC Q. 25, 25-45, 73-88 (1964); JACQUES WAARDENBURG, L'ISLAM DANS LE MIROIR DE
L'OCCIDENT: COMMENT QUELQUES ORIENTALISTES OCCIDENTAUX SE SONT PENCHIS SUR L'ISLAM ET
SE SONT FORMt UNE IMAGE DE CETFE RELIGION:

I. GOLDZIHER, C. SNOUCK HURGRONJE, C.H.

BECKER, D.B. MACDONALD, LOUIS MASSIGNON (1969).

10. See

ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 315-19 (1991).
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phenomenon that one must seek an explanation for the ultimate demise
of traditional law and legal institutions.
The creation of the nation-state meant, indeed required, a decisive
transfer of power-largely devoid of authority-from the hands of the
traditional legal elites into those of the new state. The traditional legal
profession stood at the heart of the old institutions that were the target
of modernization, while the nation-state could not have become a reality
without appropriating these institutions. The legal profession originally
controlled the administration, and therefore the revenues, of charitable
trusts (awqaf) that formed the backbone of both the urban economy and
legal education. By the beginning of the twentieth century these trusts
had largely been either confiscated or placed under the direct
management of state agencies. This move ushered in a new era during
which the traditional legal profession gradually lost control over its own
sources of power, making its members heavily dependent on state
allocations which in turn diminished in a steady and systematic manner.
Furthermore, the chipping away of the powers of the religious elite
was accelerated by the creation-under colonialist pressure-of
alternative legal elites and new legal structures that began to be formed
as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. A new body of legal
professionals, trained in Western or Western-style institutions, began to
displace the traditional legal profession. With the adoption of Westernstyle law schools and hierarchical courts, these new elites were easily
incorporated into the emerging legal structures, while, at the same time,
the religious lawyers found themselves both marginalized and severely
unequipped to deal with the new reality. The new Western courts
operated on the basis of codes, and the lawyers who staffed them had
little, if any, knowledge of the workings of religious law, whether
doctrinally, judicially or otherwise. On the other hand, while the foreign
importations were incomprehensible to the traditional legal hierarchy,
their law colleges-which depended almost exclusively on the dwindling
revenues of charitable trusts-were systematically pushed aside and later
totally displaced by the modern university's law faculties. The traditional
legal specialists lost not only their judicial positions as judges, legal
administrators and court officials, but also their teaching posts and
educational functions-in short, the backbone of their very existence as a
profession. This loss constituted a coup de grace, for not only did it rob
them of their careers but also of their procreative faculties: they were no
longer allowed to extend their intellectual pedigree. The ruin of the
traditional law college-in which the jurists, judges and jurisconsults had
been trained-was the ruin of Islamic law, for the college's compass of
activities epitomized all that had made Islamic law what it was.
To ensure the total subordination of law to the newly rising nationstate, codification became the standard mode of legislation. Codification
11. See Wael B. Hallaq, Can the Shari'a Be Restored?, in ARAB LEGAL SYSTEMS INTRANSITION
(Barbara Stowasser & Yvonne Haddad eds., forthcoming).
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is not an inherently neutral form of law-making, nor is it an innocent tool
of legal practice, devoid of political or other goals. It is in fact a
deliberate choice in the exercise of political and legal power, a means by
which a conscious restriction is placed upon the interpretive freedom of
jurists, judges and lawyers. In the Islamic context, the adoption of
codification had a particular significance since it represented a highly
efficacious modus operandi through which the law was refashioned and
altered in fundamental ways. No longer could the traditional jurists rely
on their hermeneutical methods to determine what the law was; the new
order had severed the organic link between the divine texts and the
positive legal stipulations deriving therefrom. The mechanism of
interpretation, the backbone of Islamic law and the only link between the
divine and the human, ceased to operate.
Codification was not the only structural change that was introduced.
Another acute, if not traumatic, change was effected by the importation,
under colonial pressure, of an endless variety of European codes, at
times lock, stock, and barrel. The first of these was the Ottoman Penal
Code of 1858, closely modeled after the French Penal Code of 1810. In
1860, the Ottomans adopted as their own, without change or adaptation,
the French Commercial Code of 1807 (cultural, social, and legal
differences between the Middle Eastern Ottomans and the European
French did not seem to matter!). In 1863 and 1880, the Ottomans also
freely borrowed the French Maritime Law and the Law of Civil
Procedure, respectively. This wave of massive borrowings extended to
other European sources, including the Swiss, German, English, and
Italian codes of law. Later, with the emergence of the nation-states after
World War I, there were attempts at synthesizing the Islamic and
European laws, and in this process it was Egypt that led the way. By the
1970s, the Muslim world had been, legally speaking, dramatically
Westernized. It was only the law of personal status that continued to
retain provisions from the traditional Islamic law, although this area too
was codified."2
Having codified the law on the basis of Western legal models, and
having virtually decimated the infrastructure of the traditional legal
profession, the nation-state jettisoned Islamic law altogether and reigned
supreme as the unchallenged center of legal and political power. I am
convinced that when the colonial powers pressed for these reforms, they
did so without understanding either the dimensions or the ramifications
of these changes. They surely did not realize that in doing so they were
introducing a deadly combination that would one day produce a troubled
and explosive area of the world. This effort at pushing traditional
Islamic law aside and rendering it inoperable if not defunct should have
alerted many to the fact that not only had the rule of law come to an end
but that a major gap, a virtual black hole, had fairly suddenly been
12. On these and other "reforms," see NORMAN ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD (1976); N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
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created without any real substitution or replacement. On the other hand,
with the colonialist creation of the nation-state in the Muslim world,
from Syria to Morocco, and from Iraq to Malaysia, a new political order
was allowed to emerge without the benefit of the traditional legal
structures that had systemically controlled the access by political
authority to real wealth (mostly concentrated in civil society but
administered by the traditional legal profession) as well as to legal and
absolute political power. In other words, there no longer was an
independent legal system that could restrain the powers of the new
autocracies. And to make things far worse, these autocracies harnessed
the best of technology and tools of modernity to enhance their dictatorial
regimes, with brutal and tragic consequences. Small wonder then that of
the 53 member-states of the Organization of Islamic Congress none is a
true, real, or functioning democracy. The majority is ruled by truly
oppressive regimes, and any claim they may have made in exhortation of
Islamic law has been superficial and ultimately designed to acquire what
has been a thwarted political legitimacy. With the exception of only a
few cases, Islamic law has meant little else to these regimes than
chopping off of hands, the stoning of victimized women, and public
floggings. It is a sad comment that these harsh penalties have come to
embody and symbolize the vast entity that we call Islamic law.
There is no doubt that the majority of Muslims in today's world live
in fear-a sad state of existence indeed. Any enlightened world traveler
who cares to know what the average Muslim thinks and feels will soon
realize the extent of this fear. But this fear is also closely combined with
a sense of alienation-primarily alienation from the world of modern
culture which is by and large viewed as having wrought great harm to the
indigenous cultures of Muslims and to their everyday lives. The century
between the 1870s and 1970s tells a story of colossal alienation whereby
Muslims were systematically exposed to a process of deprivation, first of
their religious values and second of their native, age-old culture. And let
there be no doubt that the decimation of their traditional law is largely
responsible for both forms of alienation and deprivation. In fact, there is
no other way of explaining the recent rise of the Islamist and
fundamentalist movements throughout the Muslim world. The Iranian
revolution was merely the first of a series of popular reactions affirming
the so-called "resurgence of fundamentalist Islam." The trend continues
unabated. During the last year or two, we have seen a significant
increase in the size and power of Islamic and Islamist movements.
Recently, the Islamists won 19 out of 40 seats in the Bahraini elections.
The Islamist party in Egypt now stands next in size to the ruling
nationalist party. In Morocco's recent elections the Islamists gained 42
parliamentary seats, whereas in the previous elections they had occupied
only 14. The Algerian case is too well known to rehearse here. In
Pakistan, the two major provinces bordering on Afghanistan are ruled by
Islamist parties. In Turkey, said to be the only formal democracy in the
Muslim world, the ruling party elected recently is the Welfare Islamic
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Party. And we need not speak of the Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
other like countries, long known for their Islamist regimes.
What I would like to stress is that the alienating experiences of the
century preceding the 1970s produced grave and fierce reactions that are
readily explicable. These reactions obviously do not stem from a
particular genetic make-up, nor are they whimsical or arbitrary. The fact
that they are unprecedented in Islamic history-and they are-is an
eloquent and decisive confirmation that the so-called "roots of Muslim
rage" must be sought in the encounter between the Muslim world and
the European powers (now seen as replaced by the United States) over
the last century. But what specifically is it that lies at the root of this new
phenomenon of Muslim discontent?
I have intimated that the decimation of religious law was the
double-edged weapon that the nation-state-and the colonial powers
before it-wielded to accomplish a decisive transfer of power from the
hands of the Islamic legal profession to a secularist base of state power.
Through a total displacement of traditional, religious law by a state
apparatus possessing exclusive legal and political powers, the mission was
completely-but in the long run unsuccessfully-accomplished. Unsuccessfully, because the changes foisted upon Muslims dictatorial and
highly oppressive regimes that replaced an indigenous law according to
which Muslims lived-and lived well-for centuries. To make things
worse, they gave rise to tyrannies that had no other sanction than
brutality and willful inhumanity. The constitutions that protect individual rights and freedoms in the West have been employed in the case of
Islam as nothing less than efficient means to enhance the powers of the
ruling class, to crush the democratic process and to disband parliaments.
This is not to say, however, that Muslim discontent is not closely linked
to the international and regional politics of the ruling autocracies in their
countries and to the foreign policies of powerful nations-policies that
they deem aggressive and detrimental to them and to issues that they
care deeply about. This is undeniable. But at deeper psychological and
cultural levels, the alienation stems from a severe disconnection with
God; a connection that they have come to experience upon their
encounter with the West, with modernity and its hegemony.
I said that Islam is a religion of law, and this is a fact of crucial
importance. Islam means nothing if religious law were to be extracted
from it. Accordingly, to be a Muslim means to live by the law. Unlike
Sunday prayer, which is the Christian's main ritual connection to God, a
Friday prayer, for the Muslim, will not do. There is so much more that is
needed, a legal ritual, a divine law, a way of life and, in short, a
comprehensive system of belief and practice that generates an immediate
connection between the Muslim individual and his Lord. This has been
the reality of Muslims for over thirteen centuries, a reality that had
continued uninterrupted in the ancient Semitic Near East from the time
of Hammurabi. To say that a millennial genealogy positing an intimate
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connection between law and ancient divinities had long persisted in Near
Eastern cultures is merely to state the obvious.
Nonetheless, the fundamental and structural impact of modernity
on the Islamic world is undeniable. Whatever the Semitic-Islamic past
had been, it has changed irrevocably. Modernity is here to stay, and
whether or not today's Muslims have articulated their problems in terms
of modernity and its impact, the fact remains that they are now struggling
with the new facts on the ground. An important aspect of their struggle
is manifest in the endless attempts to make sense of their new,
modernized reality and the tradition and religion to which they are so
attached and through which they continue to define themselves. The
story of Islam in the modern world is the story of a frustrated, but not
hopeless, synthesis between the forces of tradition and those of tenacious
change; between religion and secularism; between individualism and
communalism; between political liberalism and nomocratic deism; and,
fundamentally, between cultural humanism and a divinely centered
universe.
The break-up of the traditional social, economic, legal, and other
structures has created a multiplicity of Muslim discourses, all of which
call for different solutions to the predicament. For analytical purposes, it
is possible to identify five representative camps, the first of which, the
secularist, advocates a complete break with religion and generally
embraces modernity and the West without much qualification. Its
advocates usually hail from amongst the highly educated, urban upper
bourgeoisie. This camp can be immediately precluded from consideration, since it proved insignificant even during its heyday in the 1950s
and 1960s, and is entirely marginal today. The second camp is what I
term the traditionist, which calls for a provisional acceptance of things
modern in recognition of their inevitable permanency in the lives of
Muslims. This camp, which represents the majority of ordinary Muslims
as well as the surviving but marginalized pockets of the educated, religiolegal class, has not shown adequate awareness either of the structural and
fundamental effects of modernity or of their own past. To the members
of this camp, modernity is an indistinct phenomenon and their past is a
myopically perceived image, justifying anything that the present happens
to offer. An index of their perceptions is their insistence on religion as a
guide to life and an incoherent acceptance of modern ideas and institutions. But this camp in particular is steadily losing members to the third
camp, the Islamist, which vehemently calls for a revival of puritanical
ideology. In reality, however, this ideology is a newly constructed
version of Islam that does not necessarily have much to do with what the
faith, at least from a scholarly perspective, was really all about. The
membership of this camp comes from every corner of Muslim societies,
from the street, the universities, the lower and upper social classes, as
well as from the ruling elite and parliaments. The fourth camp is
composed of the Muslim Liberalists (of whom we shall say more later)a tiny minority of intellectuals with a strong, albeit controversial voice.
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Finally, the fifth camp is the modernist. Its social make-up is partly the
educated class with significant support from the ruling elites. It tends to
embrace modern, secular institutions and ideas, but attempts to clothe
this enthusiasm with a veneer of Islamic values. In other words, this
camp accepts Islam as a nominal entity, very much in the same way that
the Christians of the West accept Christianity in a world permeated by
trenchant secularism, humanism, capitalism, and much else that is
distinctly modern.
If there is a common denominator that brings the last three major
camps together, it is that they are all searching for a solution to their
predicament, namely, making sense of their lives and existence in light of
the contradictions that the modern world has superimposed on them.
Moreover, a significant part of their discourses has, understandably and
predictably, focused on the legal aspects of this solution. Hence, the
endless proliferation of books and tracts on how to reform Islamic law.
The modernist camp, which is characterized by its manifestly nominalist
bent, stands at a disadvantage in terms of discursive formations. Thus
far, it has been unable to articulate its ideals beyond the actual practice
of its members who lead non-religious lives. This is also true of the
secularist camp.
What remains are three discursive strategies that have yielded the
vast bulk of the so-called "reformist" theories. The first of these is the
utilitarian approach, advocated mainly by the traditionists. In line with
their relatively facile adaptation to modernity, they resort to what had
earlier been a minor concept in traditional law, namely, that necessity
renders lawful what is otherwise impermissible. This legal precept had
originally enjoyed only a limited application, permitting, for instance, the
consumption of unlawfully slaughtered animals under circumstances of
hardship, such as when survival is at stake. The traditionists opted for a
dramatic expansion of the principle, arguing that today's Muslims find
themselves coerced into a modern way of life hardly of their choice, a
lifestyle that must be lived and lived lawfully out of necessity. This
approach is now almost a century old, but it has proven unsuccessful and
has lost much of its appeal. The main objections are that, on the one
hand, it is highly utilitarian while, on the other hand, it converts a minor
principle of Islamic law in such a manner as to allow this very principle to
set aside Islamic law in its entirety. 3
The second theoretical approach may be termed the literalist, which
aspires to impose a law based on, or modeled after, the same hermeneutical principles of traditional law. This approach appears to have the
support of the Islamists whose desire to restore a strictly religious law is
driven by a certain puritanical conception of history. But the realities of
modern life make it exceedingly and increasingly difficult to realize such
an approach, at least without profound contradictions, as is the case with
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Muslim women in many Muslim countries,
13. For a survey of approaches, see HALLAQ,
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for instance, are no longer subservient to men. They are highly
educated; they have joined the working force; they occupy some of the
highest political offices in their lands; and they have become economically independent. This reality, even without the profound social and
other implications arising from it, poses serious problems for any
literalist reading of the legal sources, however flexible and lenient this
reading might be. The reality of today's Muslim women is simply incompatible with what was literally prescribed for them in the Quran and the
Sunna.
The third theoretical approach may be termed the Islamic liberalist
path, an approach that is committed to what I characterize as the spirit
(in opposition to the letter) of the law as embedded in the revealed texts.
The advocates of this approach seek to uncover the underlying divine
wisdom or the rationale behind the law, thus applying a certain
interpretation of the divine intention to modern situations. Thus, if the
traditional sanction of marriage to four wives is seen, according to their
reading, as specifically aimed at providing the shelter of family life to
widows, whose only hope may have been wedlock with a well-to-do man,
then such a Quranic permission is no longer tenable in a modern society
where widows can remarry in perfect monogamy or where the state can
provide for them as part of a network of social welfare. Likewise, if the
testimony of two women was considered equal to that of a single man
because women were unschooled and forced to live in domestic
seclusion, and were therefore deemed inexperienced in public life, the
modern Muslim woman is educated and active outside the homequalities that endow her with the same legal status and capacity of men.
This approach, I believe, is the most promising, and it would appear that
there is no reason why it should not succeed. In reality, however, this
approach (and the theories it engaged) is effectively an outcast. Its
advocates are a few in number, and live either in total isolation or in
exile.1 4 One of the main objections against it is that it is so arbitrary: the
divine word can be manipulated into a particular meaning as easily as
into that of its opposite. The divine word, critics would say, is not and
cannot be so malleable.
A nagging question about the effects of these theories and
approaches is: To what extent were they, or any of them, incorporated
into practice? The answer is fairly simple. To the partial exception of
the utilitarian approach, none of these reformist theories, generally
speaking, finds expression in the legal realities of the Muslim world.
They remain no more than ink on paper. The literalist and utilitarian
approaches have failed to provide convincing and articulate arguments
capable of finding popular appeal. The literalists dismiss modernity and
the realities it has created, and their solutions are riddled with
contradictions and difficulties. The utilitarianists, on the other hand, are
viewed as having subverted the fundamental principles of the sacred law.
14. See id.
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Most importantly, however, there exists a total disconnection
between any of these voices on the one hand, and the governments' legal
policies, on the other. Seen as an oppressor of its own people as well as a
pawn of imperial interests, the state in today's Muslim world is
anathema. The point I wish to make is that the transfer of control over
law from the hands of the traditional legal profession to those of the state
represented the most important phenomenon of so-called modern legal
reform, one that signified simultaneously the eternal loss of epistemic
authority and the dawning of the much-abhorred authority and, indeed
oppression, of the nation-state. The emergence of the state as the source
of legal power (in opposition to authority) is seen as doubly repugnant
because the state not only appropriated law from the religious lawyers
(whose roots were in the community) but it also showed itself for over a
millennium to be an entity severely lacking in religiosity, piety and
rectitude. If Islamic law had represented to Muslims the best of religion
and religious life, then the state stood for the worst of worldly
temptation, corruption, and, recently, oppression. With the appropriation of law in the wake of the reforms, the state was seen to have sunk
to even greater depths of repugnancy. It has not only substituted God's
law with a non-religious law, but has chosen none other than the law of
the colonizers as its replacement.
It is this complex of problems that we are facing today, and they are
problems that concern everyone. Their ramifications are many, ranging
from desperate calls on the Muslim street to violent acts of destruction,
whether in Khartoum, Kabul, or New York. And let there be no doubt
that, at the end of the day, the culprit is the rupture of history. The
abrupt disconnection from the past, from its legacies, institutions, and
traditions, lies at the heart of these problems. As one Muslim put it
recently, to drive a car safely, one should always be looking ahead but
never without keeping an eye on the rear mirror. This metaphor is apt.
The question now is: Can Muslims retrieve some of their past to remedy
their present and future problems? Will their governments heed their
calls? And will they have any sympathetic hearing from outside
observers or from those who control their lives and destinies?
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